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ASPECTS OF THE EXECUTIVE'S POWER OVER NATIONAL
SECURITY MATTERS: SECRECY CLASSIFICATIONS AND
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE WIRETAPS
CHARLES R. NESSONt
INTRODUCTION
The abrupt conclusion of the recent trial of Daniel Ellsberg was, in
its way, disappointing. What was to have been a trial focused on the
revelation of secret executive operations in Vietnam became a case history
of secret executive operations on domestic soil. This meant that vital
questions about the secrecy classification system on which the merits of
the case turned would not be resolved: whether, for example, the govern-
ment owns classified information in the same way it owns tangible
property like jeeps and typewriters, and can control the dissemination of
classified information by using the relatively absolute powers of property
control. It meant also that everyone associated with the trial was denied
the dramatic and emotional satisfaction of seeing almost two years of hard
work brought to conclusion in a jury verdict.
Yet, the denouement of the Ellsberg case was a fitting illustration of
something that had motivated Ellsberg to release the Pentagon Papers
in the first place. The revelations of burglary and wiretapping of United
States citizens on United States soil, wrapped in justifications of national
security, and blanketed with the secrecy of covert paramilitary intelligence
operations, showed how easily the unchecked corruption of the secrecy
system could be made to serve justification for other more dangerous
unchecked powers. It illustrated how readily the enormous powers we
permit the President to exercise abroad under the cloak of secrecy can
be turned to serve executive interests at home, and how, in the process,
it can swallow fundamental liberties. The case, including its end, began
to forge a link between Vietnam and Watergate from which a basic
proposition should emerge: the inherent powers of the President to keep
secrets and to operate in secret without check by the Judiciary or Con-
gress have grown to proportions which threaten the constitutional balance,
and must be brought under the rule of law.
'Executive assertions of inherent national security powers call into
question basic power allocations within the governmental framework,
t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Professor Nesson was a defense attor-
ney for Daniel Ellsberg. This material was first delivered as a speech in the Addison
C. Harriss Lecture Series at Indiana University School of Law, Nov. 19, 1973.
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questions which fall for resolution to the judiciary. Judgments as to the
legality of the assertions of such powers typically require the courts to
resolve a conflict between executive arguments of necessity based on
national security, on the one hand, and arguments of infringement of indi-
vidual liberties and democratic principles, on the other.' Yet the conflict
is not only one of substance, it is also one of competencies. While the
Judiciary may suspect that the national security bureaucracy of the execu-
tive branch may undervalue the principles of the Bill of Rights, the
executive branch questions the competence of the Judiciary to evaluate
the needs of national security.
In fact, the evaluation of national security decisions is highly un-
congenial to the judicial process. Fact finding in secret,2 security
clearances for lawyers, litigants,3 and perhaps even judges,' and the
breadth and diversity of possible inquiry, all make for nonjusticiability.
Even if means can be jerrybuilt to produce a factual record, judges are
in a poor position to evaluate it.' The nation may rest a measure of
trust in the Judiciary's moral leadership, but none in the ability of judges
to second guess the President and his generals on military and diplomatic
Tnatters where the nation's safety is concerned.
The Judiciary is thus faced with an apparent dilemma in judging the
legality of asserted inherent national security powers. If the courts defer
to executive competence in assessing the needs of national security, the
effect may be to consign to the Executive the protection of individual
liberties to which the national security bureaucracy may be insensitive.
Yet the alternative of asserting the primacy of individual liberties re-
quires the Judiciary, either implicitly or explicitly, to take on the un-
congenial task of evaluating the asserted needs of national security and
saying that the President is wrong.
One tool employed by the Judiciary to assess the President's inherent
power over national security matters is to inquire into the ability of
1. E.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US. 579 (1952) ; Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
2. Most of the evidentiary record in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971), is comprised of secret testimony and submissions. The record remains
secret
3. In United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1063 (1972), for example, where the Government was seeking to enjoin an ex-CIA agent
from publishing a book, clearances were required for the lawyers and expert witnesses.
4. The Government comes close to suggesting this in its brief in United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Brief for United $tates at 24-25, id.
5. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 757 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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Congress to regulate this expression of executive power. An asserted
inherent power will necessarily fall into one of four conceptual categories.
It must be: (1) a power legally exercisable by the executive branch, not
subject in any way to control by Congressf6 (2) a power which the
Executive may exercise in the absence of congressional preclusion, but
which Congress could regulate or preclude if it chose;' (3) a power
which is not legally exercisable by the Executive unless authorized by
Congress ;' or (4) a power which cannot be exercised by the Executive,
notwithstanding an attempted congressional authorization.
Explicit constitutional delegation of power to the President and
explicit constitutional prohibition epitomize categories one and four. But
the characteristics of asserted powers which would distinctively place them
in the second category rather than the third, and vice versa, are not im-
mediately clear. Yet the practical difference between a judicial judgment
placing an asserted power in one or the other category may be enormous.
That is to say, a judgment that the asserted power can be exercised by the
Executive subject to possible future congressional regulation provides no
immediate check to this power. It merely preserves a congressional option
to create one. By contrast, a judgment that the power is one which can
be exercised only with the authority of Congress may create an immediate
check to the power, but on an intermediate basis which reserves the
question of the long-term allocations of national security powers to the
decisions of Congress. This means, in effect, that while the Judiciary is
not fully competent to evaluate the needs of national security, Congress
is. The result is to set the force of inertia against the asserted power. It
places the burden of going forward on the executive branch, and, at the
same time, insulates the Judiciary from the responsibility of second guess-
ing the executive's national security assessment.
I want to focus in this article on the two specific inherent executive
powers which were central to the Ellsberg case and consider the proper
6. For example, the power to make strategic military decisions in wartime would
be encompassed within the President's explicitly stated power as Commander-in-Chief.
U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2.
7. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In
Youngstown, the Supreme Court held that President Truman's seizure of the nation's
steel mills exceeded the Executive's inherent constitutional powers, in part because he
acted contrary to congressional policy expressed in the provisions and legislative history
of the Taft-Hartley Act. See id. at 634-55 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also New
York Times Co. v. United ,States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), in which Justices White and
Stewart rely on an evident past refusal of the Congress to authorize injunctive remedies
against the press to deny the Executive an inherent power to seek such injunctions. Id. at
734, 740.
8. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 741-43 (1971)(Marshall, J., concurring).
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judicial and congressional responses to their use: first, the power of
national security secrecy classification, which got the case underway, and
second, the power to use warrantless wiretaps in connection with foreign
intelligence, which brought the case to its close. Each serves to illustrate
the limitations of the Judiciary and the Congress to check executive
national security powers. On the basis of my understanding of these
two powers and their abuses, I conclude that notwithstanding the dif-
ficulties of doing so, it is essential for the courts and Congress to, develop
checks against them.
SECRECY CLASSIFICATION
Secrecy classification theoretically restricts the dissemination of
documents, the disclosure of which would injure national security.9 The
three most well known classification categories, listing from most to least
restrictive, are Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential."0 Let us assess the
system on its strongest ground.
The classification Top Secret is limited by executive rule to informa-
tion which could reasonably be expected to cause grave damage to the
national security." Information which would start wars or cause diplo-
matic breaks are cited as examples. The rules limit the number of persons
empowered to make this determination to high echelon officers in the
executive departments and agencies connected with national defense.'2
These classification rules give the appearance of strict limitation, but
they are wholly illusory. Most information is in fact classified by a process
known as derivative classification.'" This process effectively gives the
9. Exec. Order No. 11,652, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 375-76 (1973). This executive order was
promulgated on March 8, 1973, and superseded Exec. Order No. 10,501 which governed
the classification of the Pentagon Papers. Exec. Order No. 11,652 was intended to meet
many of the criticisms of Exec. Order No. 10,501.
10. Exec. Order No. 11,652, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 375-76 (1973).
11. Id. § 1 (A), 3 C.F.R. 376 (1973).
"Top Secret." "Top Secret" refers to that national security information or ma-
terial which requires the highest degree of protection. The test for assigning
"Top Secret" classification shall be whether its unauthorized disclosure could
reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national se-
curity. Examples of "exceptionally grave damage" include armed hostilities
against the United States or its allies; disruption of foreign relations vitally af-
fecting the national security; . . .. This classification shall be used with
the utmost restraint.
Id.
12. Id. § 2(A), 3 C.F.R. 377 (1973).
13. According to Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt,
There are no data available subject to verification from which to determine the
volume of information to which classification markings have been applied pur-
suant to classification guidance [derivative classification] ....
Hearings on U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices Before a Subcomm. of
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power of secrecy classification to any persons who are cleared to see
documents in the respective classification categories. Whenever a person
uses a Top Secret source in preparing a new document he is obliged to
classify the new document according to the classification of his source
of information.' Since documents must carry the highest classification
of their component parts,1" any document which uses a Top Secret source
can itself be classified Top Secret. Classification is the responsibility of
the man who prepares the new document. He is said to have derivative
classification authority. Thus, any of the more than 450,000 persons in
the government who have Top Secret classification clearances" are em-
powered to create Top Secret documents. In addition, since classification
is typically both anonymous and nonspecific,"7 a user of a Top Secret
source has no way of knowing what particular piece of information in the
source document led to its being classified Top Secret. As a result, the
derivative classifier will apply the Top Secret Classification to lis product
if he has used any information whatsoever from a Top Secret source.
As can be imagined, the process has its own peculiar malignancy.
Since research and discussion on any subject naturally derive from and
cite to the central literature on the subject, every classified document
becomes a seed from which other classified documents can grow. If
Blackstone had classified his commentaries Top Secret, then derivative
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 2523 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
14. Exec. Order No. 11,652, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 376-78 (1973), delegates authority to
classify "originally." The current Executive Order nowhere defines any secondary or
derivative authority. ,Section 6(C) provides: "Classified information and material shall
be used . . . only under conditions which will prevent access by unauthorized persons or
dissemination to unauthorized persons." Id. § 6(C), 3 C.F.R. 383 (1973). This section
appears to subsume the well established practices of derivative classification.
This is made explicit by the implementing regulations of the Department of Defense.
DOD Directive, 32 C.F.R. §§ 159.202-9, -15 (1973). Section 159.202-15 provides: "In-
formation or material extracted from a classified source will be classified . . . in ac-
cordance with the classification marking shown in the source." Id. § 159.202-15. Sec-
tion 159.202-9 provides in part: "The overall classification of a document, file, or group
of physically connected documents shall be at least as high as that of the most highly
classified component." Id. § 159.202-9.
15. DOD Directive, id. § 159.202-9.
16. According to Department of Defense answers to questions by Senator Ful-
bright, DOD had 458,682 outstanding "Top Secret" clearances as of September 24, 1971.
This figure did not include clearances issued by other government agencies. 118 CONG.
REC. S-8855 (daily ed. June 6, 1972).
17. The new Executive Order (11,652) and implementing regulations call for isola-
tion and identification of the items causing classification and of the persons who classify.
See DOD Directive, 32 C.F.R. §§ 159.202, 202-1 (1973). However the old Executive
Order (10,501) and implementing regulations also purported to require "component" clas-
sification but these provisions were generally ignored. The Pentagon Papers, for ex-
ample, contained no component classification.
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classification would require that all of the West system be classified Top
Secret as well.
In those situations in which substantive standards for secrecy are
applied, they turn out to be faint shadows of the limited definitions in
the executive classification rules. Several national security experts who
testified at the Ellsberg trial, men who had held high posts in the Pentagon
and had constantly been generating Top Secret documents, had never so
much as seen the governing executive order or been instructed on classi-
fication standards."
As a defense to the Top Secret classification of the Pentagon Papers,
government experts laid out their substantive theories for the need to
protect the information. The chief government expert explained what I
would call the vacuum cleaner theory of foreign intelligence. The "enemy"
is assumed to have a voracious intelligence apparatus which gathers up all
possible information about the United States which is then sifted and
pieced together to form an intelligence pictutre. Any given piece of infor-
mation not previously known to enemy intelligence might fill in the mosaic
in some crucial way. Disclosure of United States intelligence information
about enemy forces, for example, could seriously damage the United States
even though the enemy obviously knows the status of its own forces. Such
disclosure would permit the enemy to assess our intelligence. On the
basis of such information he might improve his counter-measures or close
off our intelligence sources. By contrast, disclosure of information about
United States activities on subjects of interest to enemy intelligence would
either give the enemy valuable information or, if the information were
stale, permit the enemy to assess how good or how bad his intelligence had
been, and, presumably, to take corrective measures. Thus, the experts
explained, even information about long since completed military opera-
tions must be kept secret, lest the enemy be given the means to fine-tune
its intelligence systems.
The government experts offered a similar theory to justify the
secrecy of both military and diplomatic decisionmaking. Each side wants
to understand the psychology of the other side's players. Therefore, in-
formation showing how our decisionmakers think would give the enemy
an advantage.
These rationalia for secrecy have a certain logic, and it is apparently
the case that many nondemocratic societies follow the dictates of that logic
18. Dr. Morton Halperin, former Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Dr.
Leslie Gelb, director of the Task Force which produced the Pentagon Papers, both so
testified. Transcript of Russo v. Byrne, 409 U.S. 1219 (1972) (unpublished, in the
Harvard Law Library).
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with some attention. Yet it should also be clear that the logic is all en-
compassing, justifying secrecy of all past and present operations and
decisionmaking relating to foreign nations. Reasons which compel open-
ness of such information in a democracy are entirely overlooked.
Once information is classified Top Secret, it tends to remain in that
classification. Until 1972 the governing executive order called for con-
tinuing review of all classified information for the purpose of declassifying
or downgrading it whenever national defense considerations permitted.
This provision, however, was a dead letter from the time it was written.
No continuing review ever took place."
Rules for automatic termination of secrecy after fixed intervals of
time were introduced by executive order in 1964, but they have not been
effective because classifiers are given discretion to exempt some categories
of information from their operation. Experts on the classification
system who testified on Dr. Ellsberg's behalf were certain that as long
as any option was available to the classifier to exempt material from
declassification he would use it freely. Those who classified the
Pentagon Papers "TOP SECRET-GROUP I," for example, knew
that "Group I" meant total exemption from declassification-in effect
eternal secrecy. But they had no idea that according to the rules, the
"Group I" category was supposed to be for material originated by foreign
governments or organizations over which the United States has no juris-
diction, or for special communications intelligence or cryptography.
The results of this system are predictably chao.tic. Intake into the
system is voracious. Legitimate outflow through the prescribed process of
declassification is utterly constipated. The system is now plodding for-
ward with efforts to declassify World War II documents. The experts
do not know how much classified information there is, but they know that
it is continually expanding. They make estimates in millions of cubic feet
of classified documents,2" and agree that a vast proportion no longer re-
motely meets legitimate classification criteria, assuming that it ever did.
The major overflow of initially classified information takes the form
of public and private disclosures by upper level executive officials. At
upper executive levels the line between authorized and unauthorized dis-
closure is extremely uncertain. Technically any official has authority to
declassify any information classified by people subordinate to him.2" Thus
when the President speaks, whether to the nation, to a reporter in private,
19. Hearings, supra note 13, at 659 (testimony of David Cooke).
20. Id. at 658-59 (statement of David Cooke, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Administration, Department of Defense).
21. Exec. Order No. 11,652, § 3(a), 3 C.F.R. 378 (1973).
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or to a friend over cocktails, he automatically declassifies as he goes. There
is no procedure, no paperwork. Declassification simply follows in his
wake. The same is true for other officials so long as they do not stray
from the pyramids of classified information which have been generated be-
neath them. Since no one keeps close track of what information has been
disclosed by officials, vast amounts of documentary material remain
stamped classified although the information has been made public.
In a sense this reflects the essence of the secrecy system. In
practical operation it establishes initial information control over all na-
tional security related information, leaving it to the discretion of higher
officials to determine what information should be disclosed in order to
obtain acceptable levels of apparent candor and support. The system
functions not to bind upper level executive officials, but to empower them
to release only the information they choose.22
The bureaucratic tendency of self-protection creates a strong pressure
toward ever broader practical interpretations of secrecy standards. Since
secrecy classification is regarded as an inherent executive power, the
practical expansion of standards goes virtually unchecked by outside re-
view. Civil disobedience in the forra of surreptitious "unauthorized dis-
closure" tends to be the only brake. Secrecy classification has thus become
an executive bureaucratic system so uncontrolled that it threatens the
working premises of democratic decisionmaking.
The result is that decisions of significance to the American electorate
may be taken and implemented in total secrecy. Policies of great impor-
tance have been justified to the electorate by the Executive's disclosure
of supportive classified information, while information which would
support the political opposition has been kept secret. This was a major
lesson of the Pentagon Papers with respect to the history of the Vietnam
War. Yet as clear as the threats which the secrecy system poses are, the
task of developing either judicial or legislative checks to executive secrecy
power is exceedingly difficult. To approach this problem, we may initially
inquire where the secrecy power falls on the spectrum of inherent powers.
Secrecy classification, on examination, would seem to be a power
which the President can exercise until Congress stops him. Although there
is no express constitutional delegation of secrecy power to the President,
the reasons for implying such a power are strong. National security in-
22. Hearings before the Foreign Operations and Government Information Sub-
committee, Hearings, supra note 13, are replete with statements to this effect. See, e.g.,
id. at 3186-96 (statement of Rear Admiral Gene R. La Rogue (retired), May 24, 1972).
Affidavit of Max Frankel, submitted in connection with 1 UNITED STATES V. NEW YORK
TIMEs COMPANY 396-413 (J. Goodale ed. 1971).
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formation control is a function closely integrated with the President's
express responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief as well as his foreign
policy responsibilities. Moreover, the classification rules are house rules;
they apply only within the executive branch." The rules are established
by executive order, not by statute. As such they apply only to executive
employees and to those private citizens, mostly defense contractors, who
agree to be bound to them by contract. The President issues orders of
this type much as a corporation president issues orders binding his em-
ployees. Although the secrecy power has enormous effects on govern-
mental decisionmaking, the effects are not focused on individual citizens.
Issues about the validity of classification, therefore, are seldom framed in
terms of conflict with individual liberty.24
Thus the President can persuasively argue that control of national
information within the executive branch is so closely integrated with the
proper functioning of the executive branch that no congressional authority
is needed to establish a secrecy classification system.
On the other hand, since secrecy has such great effects on matters
properly within congressional province, Congress could unquestionably
exert its power to regulate classification by requiring disclosure when
the interests of democratic decisionmaking so require. The obvious con-
gressional interest in this area could be the basis for placing the secrecy
power in the third category, that which requires congressional authoriza-
tion. However, despite the possible efficacy of this result, Congress has
taken no action in this respect. Indeed, the Freedom of Information Act,
which establishes a public right of access to government information, ex-
pressly excludes classified information." Ironically, this exclusion which
was meant to establish a public right to know puts Congress on record for
the first time as recognizing and deferring to the full sweep of executive
secrecy classification.
The result was played out sadly in EPA v. Mink.2" Thirty-two mem-
bers of Congress brought suit under the Freedom of Information Act to
obtain disclosure of a report which had been generated within the execu-
tive branch for the President on the controversial underground nuclear
test known as "Cannikin" on Amchitka Island. The report was comprised
of ten separate documents, six of which were classified. Congresswoman
Mink and her colleagues wanted the documents submitte d in camera to
23. Hearings, supra note 13, at 780 (testimony of William Rehnquist).
24. But cf. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (1970).
26. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
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the trial judge so that he could determine which portions of the documents,
if any, justified secrecy, and then to disclose the portions which did not.
The Supreme Court had no choice but to side with the executive
branch. Mr. Justice Stewart noted in a concurring opinion that the Canni-
kin controversy was precisely the kind of event that should be opened to
the fullest possible disclosure consistent with national defense:
Without such disclosure, factual information available to the
concerned Executive agencies cannot be considered by the people
or evaluated by the Congress. And with the people and their
representatives reduced to a state of ignorance, the democratic
process is paralyzed.2"
Nonetheless, Justice Stewart continued, Congress had built into the
Freedom of Information Act
an exemption that provides no means to question an Executive
decision to stamp a document "secret," however cynical, myopic,
or even corrupt that decision might have been.
. . . Congress chose . . . to decree blind acceptance of Execu-
tive fiat.2
Given the congressional concession of executive secrecy power, it
makes no difference whether the secrecy power falls into the second or
third category I have described. In either event, the Court could do no
more than point out to Congress that it had the power to impose controls.
The burden of cutting into the systems rests with Congress, and inertia
seems to favor the classification system. The longer executive secrecy goes
unchecked the less meaningful its already demeaned national security
standards will become, and the more the system of secrecy will come to
mirror the bureaucratic interests it can serve.
Possible Congressional Approaches
Already one is hard pressed to conceive legislation which could con-
trol the existing system. Consider the various approaches Congress might
pursue.
(1) Legislation to Reverse the Forces of Bureaucratic Inertia
Registration requirements as prerequisites for imposing a secrecy
stamp would eliminate the virtual anonymity of the present system, in-
27. Id. at 94-95.
28. Id. at 95.
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troduce accountability, and make classification ai more troublesome, hence
perhaps less automatic, process.29 Automatic declassification over a short
period unless the classifier acted again at the end of the time interval would
have a similar effect."0 Likewise, sanctions on persons who overclassify
or fail to declassify could create an incentive within the bureaucracy to-
ward openness. The only sanctions in the present system, practically
speaking, are for breaches of secrecy."' One might also consider an allo-
cation system-a quota for each agency or' office of how many documents
can be kept under stamp at one time, leaving it to each office to clean
out the old to make room for the new. A probably apocryphal story has
it that abuses of classification were sharply curtailed one year as a result
of a budget squeeze which led to a freeze in the Pentagon on the further
purchase of Top Secret safes. These suggestions are attractive, but at best
they would curb the quantity and not the quality of abuses.
(2) Rules of Exclusion
The strategy here is to identify specific categories of information
which are most vital to disclose but which are likely to be kept secret under
the present system. Such categories would not include great volumes of
information, but might include critical items concerning which the abuses
of the current secrecy system are most serious. Having identified such
categories, Congress could legislate flat mandates that any such informa-
tion must be reported immediately to the electorate or to an appropriate
body of the Congress. Congress could, for example, attempt to prevent
recurrence of the secret invasions and bombings of the Vietnam War by
mandating that, absent a declaration of war, the President must report
immediately to designated committees of the Congress the presence of ary
29. The new executive order moves in this direction. Exec. Order No. 11,652, §
4(b), 3 C.F.R. 379 (1973) ; DOD Directive, 32 C.F.R. §§ 159.200, 201 (1973). But clas-
sification in spite of the rules of executive orders rather than in conformity to them has
been the practice in the past. It is too soon to tell whether the rules of the new ex-
ecutive order will be effective.
30. Executive Order No. 11,652 provides an automatic downgrading schedule for
Top Secret which would declassify after ten years. But the classifier may exempt in-
formation from the downgrading schedule altogether if it falls into described exemption
categories. After ten years, exempted material may be reviewed on request if the peti-
tioner for review can particularly identify the document. Exec. Order No. 11,652, §§
5(A), (B), (C), 3 C.F.R. 380-81 (1973).
31. According to David Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, between
July 1, 1967, and June 30, 1971, there were 2,372 administrative penalties imposed on
DOD personnel for failure adequately to protect classified information, none for exces-
sive classification or excessive restriction on access to information. Hearings, mtpra note
13, at 2727 (letter from David Cooke to Chairman Moorhead). Exec. Order No.
11,652 provides no sanctions for overclassification.
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American troops on or over foreign territory.82 The difficulty here, how-
ever, is that this is a powerful but limited approach. The particulars are
difficult to formulate, and undoubtedly hard to legislate.
(3) The Use of Outside Review
Legislation could establish some device outside the executive branch
for review of classified material. Yet sheer volume would prevent any
agency from reviewing all of it. Some method for choosing which classi-
fied secrets should be reviewed is essential. One obvious answer is to limit
review according to citizen demand, but this depends on reasonably well-
informed citizen complainants. In other words, Congress could eliminate
or modify the current exclusion in the Freedom of Information Act to
permit review to be initiated by citizen demand, but most citizens would
not know what to ask for. A system of public listings of classified docu-
ments, similar to a library catalogue, might be conceived-, but such an ap-
proach would confront the present practice of classifying the titles of
many documents as well as the contents. There are, of course, knowledge-
able insiders who know what is being kept secret and may think it is
wrong. The hardiest of these "leak." But an external system of com-
plaint and official inquiry would not provide the insiders an alterna-
tive to leaking unless they were prepared to suffer the bureaucratic
comsequences of openly confronting the system. One can conceive
of anonymous or privileged complaint systems utilizing an ombuds-
man, but none which is realistic. All systems of revew raise ques-
tions of who will clear the reviewers. A reviewing board of ex-gener-
als would help very little,88 while straight forward provisions for judicial
review lead to raised eyebrows about the trusiworthiness of the judges.
The more acceptable the reviewer is to the national security establishment,
the less effective one would expect the review to be.
No strategy will succeed completely. For every system that is brought
under control a new secrecy system can be created. In fact, many already
exist above Top Secret.8" Each strategy of control can be circumvented
by a bureaucracy sufficiently committed to secrecy as a means of pro-
tection and an instrument of power. This, in fact, signals the broad under-
lying problem. The national security bureaucracy has become tremend-
32. This approach is advocated by Dr. Morton Halperin, now the director of the
National Security Project of the A.C.L.U.
3a. Exec. Order No. 11,652, § 7, 3 C.F.R. 383-85 (1973), provides for an inter-
agency review committee made up of representatives from the Departments of jState,
Defense, and Justice, and the A.E.C., C.I.A. and N.S.C. Id.
34. There are, for example, higher than Top Secret classification categories for
satellite photography.
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ously strong and difficult to penetrate, insulated even from the operation
of the rule of law. This might be tolerable if the values of the bureaucracy
coincided with the values of our constitutional democracy, but unfortu-
nately they diverge. The national security establishment trains meif in the
values of obedience, discipline, conformity, and ends over means. It
suppresses the liberal values of openness, dissent, and morality of means.
We see the flowering of this in both the Vietnam War and Watergate.
It is the character of the national security bureaucracy which makes
effective disclosure legislation so difficult, and yet, so essential. Secrecy,
like power, tends to corrupt. We expect an enormous amount of any
President to manage and wield the powers of espionage, diplomacy and
war, while at the same time maintaining scrupulous sensitivity to the
values of democracy and individuality at home. Only by the assertion of
democratic values by the other branches of government, as guides to which
the Executive should conform, can we hope and expect that the national
security agencies will not altogether lose sight of them.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE WIRETAPPING
Much less is known about foreign intelligence wiretapping than
about secrecy classification. What we do know, however, suggests that
the same elements which characterize the malfunctioning of the classifica-
tion system carry over to national security wiretapping as well. These in-
dude: the bureaucratic pressure to expand the practice on the principle
that information is always useful; a lack of standards for controlling the
practice; and an absence of any meaningful review of the practice outside
the executive branch. But the problems of national security wiretapping
are set against a very different constitutional and legislative background
than that of secrecy classifications, and this allows the courts to assume a
more active role in checking abuses of the power.
The framework for considering the validity of an inherent executive
power to wiretap in connection with foreign intelligence was set down by
the Supreme Court in United States v. United States District Court,3 5 the
so-called Keith case involving domestic national security wiretaps on
political groups. The case presents a marked contrast to EPA v. Mink,
and nicely illustrates the judicial strategy of passing national security
questions to Congress.
The Executive justified its unwarranted tapping of domestic political
groups in Keith by the national security argument that subversive political
groups must be stopped before they accomplish their intended subversion.
35. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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Since requiring the executive branch to amass enough evidence of sub-
versive plots to meet the probable cause requirement for a judicial warrant
would often have the effect of forcing the Executive to wait until the
damage had been done, protection of national security, it is argued, re-
quires the executive branch to conduct protective surveillance.3 6
The Supreme Court responded to this argument by differentiating
between the warrant and probable cause requirements of the fourth amend-
ment. It asserted that a judicial warrant is an essential precondition to any
domestic wiretap. However, it stated in dicta that the procedures and
standards on which the warrant would issue are subject to adjustment by
Congress to meet the needs of national security. A result of this opinion
is that the Executive is checked by the declaration that domestic taps
require warrants under existing probable cause standards; and if the
Executive wishes to lessen these restrictions, it must appeal to and con-
vince the Congress. This result would, of course, have been impossible
had Congress already recognized an inherent executive national security
wiretap power as it had in the Freedom of Information Act. But Congress
had, in fact, written a careful provision into its 1968 wiretap legislation
saying that it meant neither to recognize nor to override any inherent
executive wiretap power."'
The Court's invitation to Congress to dilute probable cause standard&
and to tailor warrant procedures to executive needs may dissatisfy fourth
amendment purists, but in fact it is the strategic core of the opinion. It
sets a strategy for dealing with the Executive's national security argu-
ments which can be employed to deal with other forms of national security
wiretapping. The Keith Court carefully left open the validity of inherent
executive powers of surveillance and intrusion where matters relating to
foreign powers are corncerned, 8 and no case in the Supreme Court since
Keith has dealt with taps relating to foreign affairs.
Following Keith, former Attorney General Richardson announced on
September 12, 1973 that the Attorney General would continue to approve
surveillance without warrant when convinced that
it is necessary (1) to protect the nation against actual or po-
tential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power; (2) to
obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the
36. Id. at 319.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (3) (1970) ; see United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297, 301-08 (1972).
38. 407 U.S. at 309 n.8, 321-22, 322 n.20.
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security of the United States; or (3) to protect national security
information against foreign intelligence activities.89
This amounts to an assertion of three separate inherent powers, the cores
of which are taps to stop leaks of classified information, taps on spies and
saboteurs, and taps on foreign missions, i.e., embassies and diplomats.
Each illustrates a different segment on the spectrum of inherent powers.
Leakers
The Kissinger taps are the best known examples of taps to stop leaks.
There were seventeen such taps, thirteen initiated against government
employees and four against newsmen who obviously had excellent news
sources within the adminstration. None of the seventeen persons had the
slightest connection with any foreign intelligence organization.
It may not be immediately clear how the executive branch justifies
these taps as necessary to protect national security information "against
foreign intelligence activities." The reasoning is as follows: foreign in-
telligence organizations absorb information from American newspapers,
and, therefore, it is essential to control leaks to the American press in
order to prevent the leaked information from reaching foreign intelligence
agencies.
The logic is impeccable, but like the vacuum cleaner theory of intel-
ligence, it sweeps up too much. The logic, if followed to its natural con-
clusions, would give enormous range to the asserted foreign intelligence
wiretap power. It could extend to any government official with access to
classified information, any recently resigned government official who had
had such access, all congressmen, a host of persons with access to classified
information in private indutry, and all persons, including newsmen, sus-
pected of receiving classified information from unauthorized sources. Given
the sprawling nature of the secrecy classification and clearance system,
pretext could be found for tapping most persons associated with the gov-
ernment.
The inherent power to wiretap to stop leaks would, then, put into
executive hands a tool with great potential for abuse. This includes the
power to check a person's political loyalties or to gather information on
political enemies, regardless of whether the person were truly suspected
of leaking. If not subject to check by outside review, such wiretaps would
remain entirely within the executive branch, not to be disclosed except
39. Department of Justice, Press Release, Sept. 12, 1973, reproduced in 14 CRIM. L.
REP. 2042 (1973). This enumeration tracks the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970).
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unwittingly in criminal cases4 when the disclosures are unable to be
presented by dropping the criminal prosecution. Even when the power
is truly used to stop leaks, its purpose is still likely to be political.
Obviously, presidents do not get upset over every leak of classified infor-
mation to the public press. Leaks are everyday occurrences. It is the
anti-administration leak, the politically embarrasing leak which causes
presidents to smoke up the wires with orders to find the culprit-the leak
of Westmoreland's request for 206,000 additional troops for Vietnam, the
bombing of Cambodia, and the lie in the President's tilt toward Pakistam.
Interestingly, two of the Kissinger taps were on men who had secur-
ity clearances but who had very little actual access to national security
information. Two of the taps were on persons who were on the staff of the
National Security Council when the taps were initiated but who soon left
and became affiliated with political figures opposed to the Administration
-one with Senator Fulbright, 1 one with Senator Muskie 2 Yet the taps
continued. The longest of the Kissinger taps was directed against one of
these men, Morton Halperin."
Unwarranted taps on newsmen illustrate the greatest threat. Even
under Branzberg v. Hayes," which eliminated the newsmen's privilege
to protect his sources from judicial inquiry, the Supreme Court left
room for newsmen to show that inquiries about their sources were made
in bad faith for the purpose of closing off sources. Given the aspects of
political information control which infect the security classification system,
it is flatly unrealistic to assume that such a tapping power would be self-
limited by the executive branch to good faith concerns for the protection
of national security information.
What is the role of the Judiciary in checking such taps? As a legal
40. Disclosure of the Kissinger taps was prompted by pressures from the Ellsberg
case. Prior to trial the trial judge ordered the Justice Department to inform the defense
whether the defendants, their lawyers or their defense consultants had been overheard on
wiretaps. The Justice Department denied that either Ellsberg or Halperin had been over-
heard (both had been overheard talking on Halperin's tapped phone). Newspaper
stories hinting at the Kissinger taps appeared in the Washington Post, May 3, 1973, at 1,
col. 1. These prompted further defense motions and led to the internal investigation by
Acting FBI Director Ruckelshaus which ultimately resulted in disclosure of the taps.
Hearings on the Nomination of William D. Rickelshaus, of Indiana, to Be Deputy At-
torney General Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-26
(1973) (explanation of William D. Ruckelshaus).
41. William Safire along with John Sears.
42. Richard Moose.
43. Morton Halperin_ Coincidentally, his name appeared three times on White
House political enemies lists, once with the notation "a scandal would be most helpful
here." See Hearings Before the Select Senate Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activi-
ties, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1695 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Select Committee Hearings].
44. 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972).
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matter taps to stop leaks are closely analogous to the unwarranted domestic
national security wiretaps declared unconstitutional in Keith. The taps
are on American citizens in this country having no connection whatever
with foreign powers. They- threaten well-defined first amendment inter-
ests. Indeed, the Executive's argument to support unwarranted tapping of
leakers is similar to its argument advanced in Keith, i.e., leakers must
be found and stopped before they go too far in compromising vital national
security information, and this requires surveillance without establishing
probable cause.
Given the general state of corruption of the classification system,
this argument is not compelling. Its rejection, however, would neces-
sarily involve the Judiciary in second guessing the Executive on the
national security considerations which supposedly underlie a decision to
wiretap. The strategy in Keith, however, would serve this case as well:
insistence on a judicial warrant as a precondition to the wiretap, but
suggesting that Congress could lower the probable cause requirement if
it found the national security argument persuasive.
Preservation of the warrant requirement, even under greatly dimin-
ished probable cause standards, would still provide major safeguards
against abuse. Fourth amendment rhetoric to the contrary, the essential
protection of the warrant procedure does not lie in the neutral magistrate
making a probable cause assessment. For example, of 816 applications for
wiretap warrants during 1971, not one was denied. In 1972, of 860
applications, 855 were granted.45 The essential check of the warrant pro-
cedure lies rather in its promise of executive accountability, and accom-
panying procedural controls. These protections in the present wiretap law
are substantial, including requirements that the application for warrants be
duly supported by affidavits,4" that full records of the tap be kept,47 tapes
preserved,4" the utility of the tap periodically reviewed,49 the degree of in-
trusion minimized" (although courts are still struggling to articulate
what this means)," and ultimate disclosure of the tap to the person who
is the object of it."
45. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORTS ON APPLICATIONS
FOR ORDFns AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNI-
CATIONS, 1972, 1973 (1973).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970).
47. Id. § 2518(8)(b).
48. Id. § 2518(8) (a).
49. Id. § 2518(5).
50. Id.
51. E.g., United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1971).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (d) (1970).
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The Kissinger taps illustrate the utter lack of procedural protections
in the absence of such warrant procedures. The Hulperin tap, for example,
was requested, authorized, and installed all on the same day.53 Such speed
was possible because no real justification had to be prepared. Once John
Mitchell initialled the request, an FBI agent called the Chesapeake and
Potomac Telephone Company and orally directed the tap. The Telephone
Company immediately installed the tap at its central switching board,
wiring the Halperin's home telephone to a leased FBI line which runs from
the Telephone Company office to the Old Post Office Building in down-
town Washington, the Bureau's main listening post. In effect, the Tele-
phone Company installed a remote extension on the Halperin's phone."
The Telephone Company never saw any authorization nor did it ever re-
ceive any written communication from the Bureau. It kept a minimal
record of the tap while it was in place, but destroyed even that record when
the tap was removed, as was their normal practice for such taps in the
Washington area.5 The tap remained in place for twenty-one months
with no further review by the Attorney General of its necessity. Con-
versations, including those of Mrs. Halperin, perhaps also of the children,
were taped and transcribed before the tapes were destroyed."0
The power to wiretap to stop leaks, like the power to tap domestic
political groups, can and should be regarded as a power which can only
be exercised by the Executive if authorized by Congress. While the power
to classify national security information and refuse to disclose it to the
public may be a power inherent to the Executive, the power to wiretap
to protect it is at once more remote from protection of national security
and more intrusive on individual liberties. In the absence of an emergency,
there is no reason why the executive branch should be permitted to avoid
justifying its general need for such taps to Congress and its particular
need for a specific tap to a court. The tapping of suspected leakers, there-
fore, should be judged a power which is not inherent to the executive
branch.
Spies and Saboteurs
A claimed inherent executive power to wiretap spies would seem, at
first, to stand on different ground. Tapping the espionage agents of
foreign governments has a clear international character and seems a
53. Deposition of William D. Ruckelshaus, Halperin v. Kissinger, Civil No. 1187-73
(Dist. Ct. D.C.).
54. Statement of Counsel for Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., id.
55. Id.
56. Authority cited note 53 szpra.
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logical extension of our government's espionage and counterespionage
program abroad. Agents of foreign powers engaged in spying might be
thought to have diminished rights to claim the protections of our Con-
stitution, and the national security dangers from successful spying might
be seen as potentially very great. Thus at first glance, the case for an
inherent executive power to wiretap spies seems a strong one, at least in
the absence of congressional legislation barring or regulating such taps.
However on second look I conclude that the spy tapping power
should be treated just as the power to tap leakers and domestic political
organizations. Spying is covered directly by espionage laws,5" hence
traditional warrant procedures are fully available. If the subject's covert
connection with a foreign power has been established, there seems no
impediment to demonstrating this before a magistrate. If it has not been
established, then there is no basis for affording the subject less than full
constitutional protections, i.e., requiring a warrant.
Most important, the foreign orientation of legitimate spy taps should
not obscure the possible abuses of such taps. The standards which the
Executive would be applying without review, assuming the inherent power
were recognized, would have no hard edges. Insulated from review, one
would expect the Executive to stretch the standards to their limits, just
as it has done in other national security areas. Who is a spy? How much
suspicion is needed? That John Ehrlichman justified the burglary of
Dr. Ellsberg's phychiatrist's office by the need to find out if a foreign spy
ring was involved in the Pentagon Papers case illustrates the expansiveness
of this area.58 In fact, Ehrlichman's response could be made in connection
with almost any event adverse to the Administration.
There seems no real necessity for the executive branch to avoid judi-
cial approval and review of its spy taps. The threat which such tapping
poses to individual liberties is significant and has been demonstrated.
Furthermore, the necessity for avoiding warrant procedures is unclear.
Congress has already provided that in emergency situations the Executive
can tap first and obtain a warrant later.55 Absent any emergency, the
Executive should hesitate to show probable cause only if the Executive
does not trust the judge's decision. Perhaps this is an area where Congress
might also wisely lower probable cause standards and permit the Executive
to make its warrant application to a judge of its own choosing. But it
57. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1970).
58. Select Committee Hearings, supra note 43, at 2576-77, 2632, 2673.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1970).
417
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
is, nonetheless, an area of executive activity for which the establishment
and maintenance of a judicial check seem essential.
Foreign Mission Taps
Taps on foreign missions-embassies and diplomats-present the
strongest case for inherent executive power. Such taps are installed for
the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence, not to catch criminals; thus
there are no traditionally justiciable standards against which a magistrate
could make a probable cause assessment, and none suggest themselves.
Judges could do little more than determine whether an appropriate person
in the executive branch had made the judgment that the tap would pro-
duce useful foreign intelligene information.60 Such taps intrude upon pri-
vate conversations, but the degree of intrusion is relatively low. Expecta-
tions of privacy are minimal in the diplomatic community. Notwithstand-
ing reciprocal treaty agreements to respect the integrity and privacy of
diplomats and embassies,"' diplomats apparently expect al manner of sur-
veillance as a part of the law of the international jungle.2
60. Bot cf. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1952).
61. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, open for signature, April 18, 1961,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 75 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. Provi-
sions of the treaty do not explicitly prohibit wiretapping if the installation of the tap
does not involve a physical trespass. Article 22 provides:
The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving
State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.
Article 27 provides:
The receiving State shall permit and protect free communication on the part of
the mission for all official purposes .... The official correspondence of the
mission shall be inviolable.
Article 29 provides: "The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. . . ." Ar-
ticle 30 provides: "The private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same
inviolability and protection as the premises of the mission." This treaty was ratified by
the Senate on September 14, 1965, and ratified by the President on November 8, 1972.
It entered into force with respect to the United States on December 13, 1972.
62. The Russians counsel their diplomats to assume that they will be overheard
when they talk on the telephone. See A. ORLovF, HANDBOOK OF INTELLIGENCE AND GuE-
ILLA WARFARE 114 (1965) ; 0. PENxcovsxiY, THE PENKOVSKIY PAPERS 138-39 (1965).
See also A. DULLES, THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE 70 (1962). Ambassador Kennan, in
his memoirs, suggests that American diplomats make the same reasonable assumption.
See G. KENNAN, MEMOIRS, 1950-1963, at 135 (1973).
Sometimes diplomats even make use of the assumed tap as a way of communicating
information to opposing governments. One of the toughest items from the Pentagon
Papers to deal with in the Ellsberg trial was an item from the volumes chronicling
United States diplomatic contacts with North Vietnam-a verbatim transcript of a tele-
phone conversation between Alexy Kosygin in London and Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow.
The text of the Pentagon Papers read as follows:
On the same day, Cooper reported that he had been told in the Foreign Office
that: (a) between 3:00 a.m. and 3:47 a.m. London time (13 February) three
priority "President's Cipher" telegrams were sent from the t$oviet delegation in
London to Moscow; (b) at 9:30 a.m. today according to a telephone intercept
Kosygin called Breshnev and said "a great possibility of achieving the aim, if
418
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Members of foreign diplomatic missions, morover, may have dimin-
ished standing to assert fourth amendment rights. As members of diplo-
matic missions they have diplomatic immunities which place them in a
different legal position vis-a-vis the Constitution and domestic law than
other aliens and citizens." While we normally think of diplomatic immu-
nity as a special protection, it can be seen also merely as insulation from
the operation of domestic law whereby all but incidental problems of diplo-
matic missions are treated as matters for resolution between nations. The
added protection of diplomatic immunity from the operation of domestic
law would, in this view, carry with it a diminished capacity to claim the
protections of domestic law, including the fourth amendment, against oper-
ations of the executive branch. Thus, whle a tap on an embassy may give
rise to a diplomatic complaint against the United States, it would not
give rise to litigation in the domestic courts of either nation.
Foreign mission taps will pick up conversations of United States
citizens who call into the tapped phone. Such citizens, of course, have
undiminished fourth amendment rights. The question is whether the
scope of those rights extends to calls made to foreign missions.
Most calls to foreign missions are likely to be on business matters, and
many persons calling foreign missions in this country may have no greater
expectation of privacy than they would have if calling a foreign govern-
ment office in a foreign country. The degree of intrusion from the inci-
dental overhearings is likely to be far less than if the tap were on the
citizen's phone. Nonetheless, while the significance of incidental over-
hearings of United States citizens may be discounted, they present the
most serious conceptual problem to the recognition of an inherent power
to tap foreign missions.
Of key importance is that foreign mission taps are not subject to
infinite expansion and gross abuse. Whereas a tapping power which could
be directed at suspected leakers or suspected spies would, as a practical
matter, give the executive branch power to tap almost anyone for any pur-
the Vietnamese will understand the present situation that we have passed to
them; all they need do is give a confidential declaration.
- UITED STATEs-VETNAm RELATIONS 1945-1967: NEGOTIATION CONTAcTs-SuN-
PLOFWER 61-62 (196 ), in record of United $tates v. Russo and Ellsberg, No. 9373-WMB-
CD (C.D.Cal. 1972) (transcript on file at Harvard Law School). Apparently Ellsberg
had blown a wiretap. Our investigation into the circumstances of the call convinced us,
and I hope we convinced the jury, that Kosygin made his call on an open line from his
room in Claridge's Hotel, cognizant that the British and American governments would
know in the most credible way that he was actually conveying back to Moscow the mes-
sages he had told the British and Americans he would communicate. A short time later
he went to the Russian embassy in London and sent a coded message to Moscow, evi-
dently to convey information that he did not want overheard.
63. Vienna Convention, supra note 61, arts. 31-41.
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pose, a tapping power limited to embassies and persons with diplomatic
immunity has bright lines at its edges. The category of persons subject
to such taps is limited in a manner that does not permit discretionary
expansion at the margins. Also, it is made up of persons who offer little
incentive for tapping other than for the foreign intelligence purposes which
justify the power.
The executive branch will not state publicly that our government taps
foreign embassies and diplomats. The niceties of international discourse
prevent that. If challenged, however, the Executive would doubtless claim
great utility for such taps. One can also picture the counterclaims. The
very fact that diplomats expect to be tapped may mean that the tappers sel-
dom overhear anything but routine embassy business and chitchat. On the
vacuum cleaner and personality approaches to intelligence gathering,
everything is valuable. But whether such value is real or offsets the fourth
amendment interest at stake is another question. Ramsey Clark, based on
his exposure to such taps while Attorney General, sharply questions their
utility. He stated:
I know that not one percent of the information that is picked up
has any possible utility. It would only be an act of extreme
careless~ess or extreme urgency that would cause the use of a
channel that is assumed by reasonable people in the foreign mis-
sions in this country to be under surveillance."'
Asked what impact on national security would follow from a discontinua-
tion of all such taps, Clark answered, "absolutely zero."
A direct clash of views on the utility of embassy taps is precisely the
kind of national security question which courts would have great difficulty
in litigating and evaluating, especially if the outcome were to be a rejection
of the Executive's national security arguments. This suggests that the
Keith strategy of shunting the national security questions to Congress
might be appropriate. The problem, however, is more complex here. Con-
gress is in no better position than the Executive to make a public declara-
tion that foreign mission taps are acceptable. Yet Congress cannot delegate
power secretly. Although congressional hearings may be held in executive
session, Congress must pass a public statute, if it wishes to regulate the
warrant procedures and adjust the standards of probable cause to suit the
Executive's needs. Lower courts, when confronted with embassy taps,
64. Hearings on Practices and Procedures of the Department of Justice for War-
rantless Wiretapping and Other Electronic Surveillance Before the Subcomm. on Admin-
istrative Practice and Procedure o'f the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary. 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 53 (1972).
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have faced similar problems of public articulation. They have resolved
them by adjudicating the legality of embassy taps in camera, and delivering
opinions which neither identify the locus nor the specific nature of the tap.
Such an approach is possible only if the judicial outcome is to uphold the
legality of the unwarranted taps. Thus, where foreign mission taps are
concerned, the Keith approach is not truly available.
The courts, then, must directly resolve the conflict between national
security and individual liberties which foreign mission taps present. On
the one hand, there is no way to finesse the problem of judicial competence
to weigh national security claims. This must be weighed against the
limited and relatively mild intrusions on individual liberties which such
taps entail. The balance thus supports finding an inherent executive power
to undertake such taps, subject to control by the Congress if it chooses to
assert it. This is an acceptable, albeit uncomfortable, outcome precisely
because this executive power, unlike the powers of secrecy classification,
leak-tapping and spy-tapping, does not pose the kind of threat to demo-
cratic principles which demands an outside check.
CONCLUSION
Secrecy and wiretapping are by no means the only national security
powers which demand control, but they do illustrate the great extent to
which the political advantages of information control can lead the exec-
utive branch to corrupt national security standards and to override indi-
vidual liberties. They illustrate, also, possibilities and difficulties of
bringing national security powers under control, and the extent to which
the task of doing so is shared and divided between Court and Congress.
The Vietnam War and Watergate may mark an end to the cold war era.
Both seem to be ultimate expressions of a cold war mentality, revealing
the threats of rampant secrecy and unchecked executive powers to con-
duct covert operations. The hallmark of the cold war era has been a
willingness to compromise basic American ideals to the supposed necessi-
ties of national security. Perhaps Vietnam and Watergate will sufficiently
discredit the mystique of national security to permit a resurgence of those
ideals.
